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11 Introduction
The banking sector is often blamed for exposing the economy to systemically important risks
through either excessive credit creation and asset bubbles during episodes of credit boom,
or excessive cut back in credit during slumps. The basic reasoning behind such arguments
is that credit supply matters. For example, a relaxation in lending standards may lead to
excessive credit creation during booms and large losses to capital may generate a deleveraging
cycle that wipes out good credit during busts.
The concern that malfunctions in the credit supply process may generate unnecessary
crises leads to calls for large scale policy intervention in credit markets. For example, central
banks are advised to ￿lean against the wind￿ if credit is expanding due to lax lending
practices. On the other hand, central banks and governments are urged to inject liquidity
and capital in the banking system if credit is being cut due to a deleveraging process.
This note seeks to answer the following question:
￿ What tools does a regulator or policy maker have at her disposal to judge whether
changes in bank credit are driven by supply-side factors?1
The question is important because if change in bank credit were driven by genuine
demand-side factors such as productivity shocks or shocks to expectations, then policy in-
tervention based on the premise that the fault lies on the credit supply side can be counter
productive. Moreover, even if supply-side factors in￿ uence bank credit, these factors may
not be too relevant for the economy if there are su¢ cient new and alternative sources of
￿nancing to pick up any slack created by mis-performing banks.
I outline a methodology that can help policy makers better understand the extent to
which supply side factors generate aggregate ￿ uctuations in credit. The methodology is
based on the regulator having access to a timely and comprehensive credit registry that
contains information on every business loan given out by the banking sector. While such
credit registry data are available in many countries around the world, the U.S. does not
1My focus here is on commercial lending to ￿rms. A related question corresponding to consumer ￿nancing
is discussed by Amir Su￿ in the article ￿Detecting Bad Leverage￿in this volume.
2currently have a comparable system. I discuss the design issues related to the building up a
credit registry database in section 2. Section 3 outlines the methodology that can be applied
to credit registry data to isolate the role of supply-side factors and section 4 provides real
world examples. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of some of the limitations of the
proposed methodology.
2 Credit Registry Design
I begin with a brief description of the design of credit registries (see World Bank 2011 for
more details). There are four basic steps in the design of a credit registry system: data
collection, data validation, data dissemination and data usage.
Data collection: Credit registry data are collected from every commercial borrower in
the banking system. The data contain identi￿cation information on borrower and lender,
and may include details such as name, location, industry and ownership information. In-
formation on location, industry and ownership is particularly useful for testing if credit is
concentrated in certain regions, industries, or groups of companies and whether such trends
have strengthened over time. A typical credit registry records both positive and negative
credit information. Positive credit information includes total amount of credit issued, credit
outstanding, maturity, and collateral value (if any). Negative credit information includes
default rate (broken by 30-day, 60-day, etc.), recovery in case of default and any legal ac-
tions against the borrower in the past. In certain countries there may be a sunset provision
on negative information such that negative information is automatically deleted from the
record after a pre-determined number of years. It is common for credit registry data to be
updated on a monthly basis. With the advancements in information technology, collecting
credit registry data at a monthly frequency is not too cumbersome.
Data validation: An important step after data collection is its validation to minimize
errors. Automated routines can be set up to check if the data are coded appropriately
and whether individual data items add up to the consolidated version. Any signi￿cant
discrepancy found in the validation stage can be sent back to the data collection stage for
3further veri￿cation. Random audits of loan level data are also useful in strengthening data
quality and incentivizing data collectors to monitor the process appropriately. Such audits
not only help keep the data quality high but also improve transparency and reliability of the
banking sector ￿nancial data.
Data dissemination: Every credit registry data must have appropropriately designed
rules on how data will be disseminated and who can get access to the data. There is a
fundamental tension between maintaining proprietarship of data and making data accessible
to a wider audience. Banks that rely on "relationship banking" may want to keep their
portfolio con￿dential to maximize leverage and rents in their relationship. Doing so may
- in theory - also be optimal ex-ante to give incentives to banks to spend e⁄ort in adding
￿rst-time borrowers to the banking sector. However, such bene￿ts of data proprietership
must be weighed against the broader bene￿ts of data sharing. These include enabling banks
to get a real time sense of the overall exposure of their clients (and related parties) with
other banks and allowing regulators / researchers quick access to data for macro prudential
purposes (as explained in next sections).
Putting all this together, while it is important to create and share credit registry data,
it is equally important to outline strict guidelines on who can access the data and how. It is
imperative that everyone contributing to the credit registry data must have full con￿dence
that the data will only be used for legitimate purposes.
Data Usage: Once a credit registry data is put in place, an obvious use of the data is
to help regulators and the banking sector use the data for prudential and risk-management
purposes. The rest of this note explains how the data can also be combined with more
scienti￿c empirical methodologies to better identify the fundamental drivers of credit boom
and bust. The accumulated knowledge can then help policy makers make more informed
choices.
43 Methodology
The methodology outlined here was introduced by Mian and Khwaja (2008) and augmented
by Jimenez, Mian, Peydro and Saurina (2011). The basic purpose of the methodology is to
test speci￿c hypotheses about the role of supply-side factors in generating observed changes
in bank credit. The methodology o⁄ers two advantages from an econometric standpoint.
First, it provides an unbiased estimate of the supply-driven ￿bank lending channel￿e⁄ect.
Second, it takes into account general equilibrium adjustments made at the borrower level in
reaction to the bank lending channel e⁄ect and provides a bias-corrected net e⁄ect of the
bank lending channel at the borrower level. We brie￿ y illustrate the methodology below.
Consider an economy with banks and ￿rms indexed by i and j respectively. Firm j
borrows from nj banks at time t and assume that it borrows the same amount from each
of the nj banks. The economy experiences two shocks at t : a ￿rm-speci￿c credit demand
shock ￿j and a bank-speci￿c credit supply shock ￿i: ￿j re￿ ects changes in the ￿rm￿ s demand
for credit driven by productivity or customer demand shocks. ￿i re￿ ects changes in the
bank￿ s funding situation, such as a run on short term liabilities (a negative shock), or new
opportunities to access wholesale ￿nancing (a positive shock.)
Let yij denote the log change in credit from bank i to ￿rm j: Then the basic credit channel
equation in the face of credit supply and demand shocks can be written as:
yij = ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿i + ￿j + "ij (1)
Equation (1) assumes that the change in bank credit from bank i to ￿rm j is determined
by an economy wide secular trend ￿; credit supply and credit demand shocks, and an idio-
syncratic shock "ij: While equation (1) is reduced form in nature, it can be derived as an
equilibrium condition by explicitly modeling credit supply and demand schedules.
In a frictionless world (as in the Modigliani-Miller theorem), bank lending is independent
of credit supply conditions and only depends on ￿fundamental￿credit demand factors. Fi-
nancial intermediaries in such scenarios have no impact on the economy and, hence, there is
no bank transmission channel, i.e. ￿ = 0 in equation (1). The presence of ￿nancing frictions,
5however, may force banks to pass on their credit supply shocks ￿i to borrowing ￿rms, making
￿ > 0:
￿ if often referred to as the ￿bank lending channel￿ , and is the key supply-side parameter
of interest. ￿ can be estimated from (1) using OLS, giving us b ￿OLS = ￿ +
Cov(￿i;￿j)
V ar(￿i) : The
expression implies that as long as credit supply and demand shocks are signi￿cantly corre-
lated, b ￿OLS in (1) would be a biased estimate of the true ￿. For example, if banks receiving a
positive liquidity shock are more likely to lend to ￿rms that simultaneously receive a positive
credit demand boost, then ￿ would be biased upwards. Khwaja and Mian (2008) resolve
this issue by focusing on ￿rms with nj ￿ 2; and absorbing out ￿j through ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects.
The estimated coe¢ cient b ￿FE then provides an unbiased estimate of ￿:
However, b ￿FE does not give us a complete picture of the net e⁄ect of bank lending channel
on the economy. In particular, individual ￿rms a⁄ected by the local lending channel due to
a positive ￿ in equation (1) may seek funding from new banking relationships to compensate
for any loss of credit. Jimenez et al (2011) show that an unbiased estimate of the net (or
aggregate) e⁄ect of supply-side banking shocks on borrower j can be estimating using the
equation:
yj = ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿j + ￿j + "j (2)
where yj denotes the log change in credit for ￿rm j across all banks.2 It is not a simple
average of yij from (1) since a ￿rm can start borrowing from new banks as well. ￿j denotes





represents the set of banks lending to ￿rm j at time t: "j is an idiosyncratic error term. The
same credit demand shock ￿j appears in both equations (1) and (2) under the assumption
that the shock equally a⁄ects a ￿rm￿ s borrowing from all banks. The aggregate impact of
credit supply channel is captured by the coe¢ cient ￿: If there is no adjustment at ￿rm-level
in the face of bank-speci￿c credit channel shocks, then ￿ = ￿:
2Depending on data availability, it could include non-bank sources of credit as well.
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Cov(￿i;￿j)
V ar(￿j) :3 While the
variance of ￿j can be estimated in data, the covariance term between credit demand and credit
supply shocks is unobservable to the econometrician. However, a unique advantage of the
preceding ￿xed-e⁄ects estimator at loan level is that it allows us to back-out the covariance
term. Since b ￿FE is an unbiased estimate of ￿; we can write Cov(￿i;￿j) =
￿
b ￿OLS ￿ b ￿FE
￿
￿
V ar(￿i); where variance of bank credit supply shocks ￿i can be estimated directly from data.
Thus the aggregate lending channel e⁄ect, ￿; can be estimated as:
b ￿ = b ￿OLS ￿
￿






The second term on the right hand side of (3) is the adjustment term that corrects
for any bias in the OLS estimate of (2). The adjustment term corrects for the otherwise
unobserved covariance between credit supply and demand shocks. The extra variance term
in the denominator corrects for the fact that the variance of bank shocks averaged at the
￿rm level may be di⁄erent from the variance of bank shocks overall.
A key advantage of the proposed methodology is that it can be implemented in real time.
In particular, for any given bank shock ￿i that is suspected of generating a transmission
channel, run OLS and FE versions of (1) to estimate b ￿OLS and b ￿FE respectively. Then esti-
mate ￿rm level equation (2) using OLS to generate b ￿OLS: Finally plug these three coe¢ cients
in (3) to estimate the unbiased impact of credit supply channel at the ￿rm level.
A second advantage of the proposed procedure is that it relies on credit registry data
which exists in most countries of the world with banking supervision departments. We next
provide three examples of the use of this methodology from Pakistan, Spain and the United
States.






4.1 Nuclear Tests And Dollar Deposit Run On Banks In Pakistan
The unexpected nuclear tests by Pakistan in May 1998 imposed sti⁄sanctions on the country
that led to a serious balance of payment crisis. Consequently the government defaulted on
its obligation to pay back dollars that it had borrowed through the banking sector￿ s ￿dollar
deposit scheme￿ . The default on dollar obligations led to a serious run by depositors on the
banking sector. However the run was not uniform across banks, but concentrated on banks
that were more reliant on dollar deposits as a funding source4.
Khwaja and Mian (2008) evaluate the credit supply consequences of the run on bank
deposits. We estimate equation (1) with borrower ￿xed e⁄ects separately for each quarter t.
yij is de￿ned as log change in loan from bank i to ￿rm j. The change is computed from the
quarter prior to the nuclear tests till quarter t. ￿i is de￿ned as the log change in deposits for
bank i in the aftermath of the nuclear tests.
The set of estimated coe¢ cients b ￿FE;t (one for each t), trace out the supply side impact
of the run on deposits. Each coe¢ cient b ￿FE;t is computed using the within-￿rm di⁄erence in
loan growth from banks with (relatively) high deposit growth versus banks with low deposit
growth. Figure 1 plots this di⁄erence after classifying above and below median deposit
growth as ￿positive￿and ￿negative￿liquidity shocks respectively.
There is no sign of a credit supply e⁄ect until the nuclear shock hits. Following the
nuclear tests, we see a strong credit supply e⁄ect from the run on deposits. While there
is a strong credit supply shock at the loan level, Mian and Khwaja (2008) show that this
e⁄ect is completely neutralized by large ￿rms (top 30% of ￿rms by size) as they are able to
borrow from new sources of funding. Thus the credit supply shock ends up a⁄ecting only
smaller ￿rms. Such an analysis can help policy makers understand the magnitude of the
credit supply shock, and isolate the set of ￿rms most in need of additional credit support.
4Banks could not hold these dollar deposits themselves. They turned over the dollar deposits to the
central bank in exchange for equivalent rupees under the promise that the central bank would return dollars
on demand from the depositor.
84.2 Real Estate Securitization And Bank Credit In Spain
Jimenez et al (2011) apply the methodology above to the case of Spain and test whether
the boom in real estate securitization during the 2000￿ s enabled banks with large real estate
assets to expand credit supply by securitizing their real estate portfolio. They estimate
equation (1) with borrower ￿xed e⁄ects separately for each quarter t. yij is de￿ned as log
change in loan from bank i to ￿rm j. The change is computed from 2004Q4 till quarter
t. ￿i is de￿ned as the ex-ante (year 2000) variation in real estate holdings for bank i. Real
estate exposure proxies for the capacity of banks to securitize assets during the securitization
boom. The analysis utilizes a comprehensive quarterly loan level credit registry data from
the Bank of Spain that covers a period from 1999Q4 to 2009Q4.
Figure 2 plots the ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ect estimate of the credit supply e⁄ect of real estate
exposure, b ￿FE;t: Starting 2004 (when securitization in Spain shoots up), there is a strong
positive credit supply e⁄ect for banks with real estate exposure due to improved access to
wholesale ￿nancing. The positive credit-supply e⁄ect turns negative in 2008 however as
global securitization market shuts down.
Jimenez et al (2011) show that despite a signi￿cant loan-level credit supply e⁄ect, the net
(aggregate) impact of securitization at the borrower level is muted due to a ￿crowding out￿
e⁄ect. Nonetheles there is a signi￿cant aggregate impact of the expansion in credit supply
on the price of credit. Securitization also leads to a reduction in loan collateralization rates
and lengthens maturity of loans.
4.3 U.S. Financial Crisis And Bank Credit Lines
Some observers argue that a reduction in the supply of credit to corporations was an impor-
tant factor in precipitating the economic downturn during 2007-08. Ivashina and Sharfstein
(2010) show that corporations drew down on their lines of credit signi￿cantly during this
period, and especially more so from banks experiencing larger losses and thus under greater
threat of going bankrupt. One interpretation of this evidence is that there was a ￿run￿by
corporations on weak banks under the fear that future credit supply may be choked o⁄.
However, in a recent paper using loan level data from the Fed￿ s SNC program Mian and
9Santos (2011) show that the increase in drawn lines of credit is not unique to the 2007-09
crisis. The same pattern is seen in each of the previous two recessions of 1990-91 and 2001 as
well, and there was no banking crisis in 2001. Thus an alternative demand-based explanation
for the increase in draw-down ratio is that as the economy slows, ￿rms draw down as much
as they can before their credit worthiness deteriorates.
We can use the methodology above to test if the corporate run on undrawn lines of credit
wsa driven by credit supply shock. Using loan level data on syndicate loans from the Fed, we
estimate equation (1), with yij de￿ned as change in draw down percentage of a syndicate loan
from lead-bank i to ￿rm j. ￿i captures the exposure of a lead bank to the crisis, which we
proxy using bank￿ s ultimate charge-o⁄s to assets. We also add the initial level of draw-down
percentage on the right hand side since the change in draw down is mechanically related to
the initial draw down percentage.
While simple OLS estimation of (1) over 2006-07 and 2007-08 shows that banks with
larger ultimate losses experience larger increase in draw-down percentage, this result is en-
tirely driven by less credit worthy ￿rms more likely to borrow from banks with greater
exposure to the crisis. The unbiased borrower ￿xed e⁄ect estimate b ￿FE is no longer posi-
tive with reasonably small standard errors. Thus the correlation between bank losses and
increase in borrower draw down ratio is driven by the endogenous matching of ￿rms with
low credit worthiness to banks that end up experiencing large losses.
5 Concluding Discussion
Most concerns about systemic risk relating to the banking industry are based on the premise
that bank credit supply may get out of whack with economic fundamentals. This note
outlined a methodology that can be used to test speci￿c hypotheses about the extent to
which changes in credit are driven by supply-side factors. The methodology uses loan level
credit registry data that are increasingly available in many countries. However, surprisingly
the U.S. lags behind in the availability of detailed loan-level data. Ideally one would like to
have loan-level data that covers the entire banking sector, and follows not just loan quantities
10but also price terms such as interest rate, maturity, collateralization rate and basic covenants.
While I discussed three examples relating to my own work, other scholars have also
used the methodolog highlighted here in conjunction with credit registry data to isolate
credit suply e⁄ects. These include Cetorelli and Goldberg (forthcoming) on international
transmission of credit supply shocks during 2007-08, Lin and Paravisini (2010) on the credit
supply e⁄ect of bank reputation in the U.S., Paravisini (2008) on credit supply e⁄ects in
Argentina, Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2010, forthcoming) on credit supply e⁄ects
of monetary policy in Spain, and Schnabl (forthcoming) on the international transmission
of credit supply shocks in Peru.
I end with some caveats regarding the use of this methodology in practice. First, the use
of credit registry data is feasible at a monthly or quarterly frequency only. Thus analysis of
the sort discussed in this paper is more suitable for low frequency analysis.
Second, the methodology is based on a cross-sectional comparison of changes in loans
over time, and may be viewed as a speci￿c version of the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences approach.
As such the methodology is useful to the extent there are legitimate reasons to believe that
the impact of credit supply is not uniform across all banks.
Third, the methodology by design limits the analysis to borrowers with multiple banking
relationships. There is thus a concern that single relationship borrowers that may be most
adversely impacted by credit supply shocks are left out. However, more than three quarters
of bank lending often goes to borrowers with multiple relationships. Moreover, variation
within multiple relationship ￿rms can also be used to test if credit supply shocks a⁄ect
smaller ￿rms di⁄erentially.
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